demonstrate that interpersonal trust substantially impacts economic growth, and that su±cient interpersonal trust is necessary for economic development. To investigate the ability of policy-makers to a®ect trust levels, this paper builds a formal model characterizing public policies that can raise trust. The model is used to derive optimal funding for trust-raising policies when policy-makers seek to stimulate economic growth. Policies examined include those that increase freedom of association, build civic cultures, enhance contract enforcement, reduce income inequality, and raise educational levels. Testing the model's predictions, we¯nd that only freedom, redistributive transfers, and education e±ciently and robustly stimulate prosperity. They do this by strengthening the rule of law, reducing inequality, and by facilitating interpersonal understanding, all of which raise trust.
1 Introduction Zak & Knack (2001) demonstrate that interpersonal trust has a considerable e®ect on economic growth as trust a®ects the transactions costs associated with investment. 1 Their analysis shows that if trust is su±ciently low, so little investment will be undertaken that economic growth is unachievable, resulting in a low-trust poverty trap. Even in a growing economy, interpersonal trust is a powerful economic stimulant: a 15 percentage point increase in the proportion of people who report that others in their country are trustworthy raises per capita output growth by 1%
for every year thereafter. Further, economic growth initiates a virtuous circle as income gains enhance interpersonal trust.
Because di®erences in trust directly cause di®erences in economic performance, if trust is malleable by policy it would provide substantial leverage to policy-makers seeking to in°uence living standards. This question itself is unconventional as the literature has largely considered trust to be determined by exogenous \local conditions." For example in Italy, Putnam (1993) traces the cultural factors determining low trust in the south to the 12 th century Norman regime centered in Sicily. 2 Across the American states, trust and other dimensions of social capital are 1 Zak, Paul J., and Knack, Stephen, Trust and Growth, The Economic Journal 111:295-321, 2001. 2 Putnam, Robert; with Robert Leonardi and Ra®aella Y. Nanetti, Making Democracy Work. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993. Building Trust 2 strongly predicted by ethnic and religious composition (Rice & Feldman, 1997; Knack, 2000) . 3
Weingast (1997) argues that the adoption and implementation of constitutional rules to enforce property rights, a component of environments that produce trustworthiness, is ultimately dependent on the homogeneity of citizens' preferences. 4 Similarly, cross-country studies show that trust is higher in ethnically homogeneous countries (Zak & Knack, 2001; Knack & Keefer, 1997) . 5
Putnam (2000) exhaustively surveys the factors associated with trust and social capital, but does not concretely identify policies that raise trust. 6 We investigate how to build trust by constructing a dynamic general equilibrium growth model that identi¯es the ways that government policies impact the constituents of trust. 7 Importantly, the model is used to derive an e±ciency criterion that permits the cost of each policy to be compared to the enhanced income growth it produces by raising trust. We then investigate the impact of a broad set of policies on growth empirically and determine if any of these satisfy the e±ciency criterion. While our analysis indicates that a number of government policies robustly in°uence trust levels, few of these meet the e±ciency criterion showing that they can be used as a development strategy. The only policies examined that meet this criterion are raising educational levels, redistributive transfers, and increasing civil liberties. Though this policy set is smaller than one would have hoped for, it does not mean that governments should not expend resources to raise trust. Trust is essential to myriad aspects of civil society that we have not included in our analyses; indeed, the economic e®ects of trust, though measurable, may be among the least important factors shaped by trust. Of the¯ve factors that produce trusting behaviors, two su®er such substantial measurement problems that we ignore them in the present analysis, those being social norms and wealth.
Social norms are multidimensional and therefore not only di±cult to measure, but necessarily di±cult to control through policy. On the other hand, wealth, though reasonably well-measured, is too highly correlated with income to provide a measurably independent e®ect on trust. Lastly, note that while social and economic heterogeneity can be directly measured, absent importing or exporting particular groups of individuals, we will focus on economic heterogeneity ( 
where t denotes time. Note that income is lagged in (1) to capture the feedback between income levels and trust.
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Trust at time t, @ t , is measured by the proportion of income not expended to enforce contracts, following Zak & Knack (2001) ; that is, @ t´y t ¡´t y t 2 [0; 1]. It is important to mention that this measure of trust is not the trust in one's heart, but observed trust in actual transactions and therefore dependent upon the institutional, social, and economic environments in which transactions are embedded. This idea is fully developed in our earlier paper; here we simply take it as given that trust is a decision, not an innate, unchangeable preference. This follows directly from de¯ning trust as something that occurs within the context of intertemporal transactions. 8 To reiterate, trust is de¯ned as the income not spent on specifying and verifying contract compliance when engaging in an investment in which the second transactor can renege on the¯rst, causing him or her to lose some or all of moneys invested. Further, de¯ning trust this way makes it an economically meaningful variable.
The model in our previous paper demonstrates that transactions costs h(¢) decrease in contract enforceability, e, and income y, while it increases in income inequality ª. By construction, raises trust and therefore´falls as¸rises. The policy instruments available to in°uence the factors that a®ect transactions costs in (1) are: increased judicial funding p to better enforce contracts, e = e(p); income transfers ¾ that reduce income inequality, ª = ª(¾); as well asw hich can broadly be de¯ned as investment in civic culture that builds interpersonal ties, following Putnam (2001) . Because transactions costs are jointly endogenous in income, lagged per capita income y t¡1 is included as a control variable in the empirical studies that follow rather than a policy variable per se.
Given this formalization of the factors that produce and in°uence trust, we next characterize a policy-maker's choice calculus. Because trust is perfect if all economic agents are identical, interpersonal diversity is an essential aspect to a model of trust. With heterogeneity, there is no \standard" social welfare function for policy-makers to maximize when making policyfunding choices (Azariadis, 1993) . 9 As a result { and because policy-makers everywhere are concerned with citizens' living standards { we consider economic growth to be the policy-maker's objective. Clearly this is a naÄ ³ve view of how policy is set, though such an approach explains a substantial proportion of government expenditures (Bueno de Mesquita, et al, 1999; Ghate & Zak, forthcoming) . 10 Yet we view this approach as a useful benchmark to which actual policy choices can be compared.
Formally, policy-makers take into account how individuals react to policy changes in their decision process. That is, a unitary-actor government and citizens play a Stackelberg game, with the government moving¯rst. Given the discussion above of the policy-maker's objective, polices are chosen to maximize the growth of productive capacity (called capital deepening) 11
In this problem, policies are funded by a lump-sum tax ¿ t , as shown in the government budget constraint which is the last constraint in (2). The¯rst constraint is the law of motion for the capital stock taking into account consumer optimization. Consumers in this model are Solovian and save proportion¯2 (0; 1) of their after-tax, after-transactions cost income which°ows into the capital market to fund investment. Using standard stock accounting, investment is the change in the capital stock
is the rate of physical depreciation of capital. Lastly, note that for simplicity, there is no population growth in the model, and population size is normalized to unity. 12
The optimal policies that solve (2) are
The above equations implicitly de¯ne the optimal values for p t (equation 3), ¾ t (equation 4), and¸t (equation 5). These conditions have a straightforward interpretation. They state that using the growth criterion in (2), the marginal cost of funding each policy (which is unity when policies are funded with a lump-sum tax) must equal, at an optimum, the marginal bene¯t with respect to growth from each policy due to a reduction in transactions costs h.
Equations (3) -(5) are useful for two reasons. First, they specify the way that government policy is expected to a®ect levels of trust in a society. This therefore circumscribes the causative chain that our empirics seek to quantify. Second, these conditions de¯ne a set of optimality criteria vis-µ a-vis funding levels for various policies. As Figure 1 illustrates, policies can be overor under-funded with respect to the growth optimum (taking into account the economic drag from taxes). Thus, equations (3) -(5) not only tell us how policy impacts trust, but whether observed policies are being funded optimally.
[ Figure 1 Each of the three sub-indexes is scored from 0-6, so the overall index can range from 0-18, with higher values re°ecting better governance.
Other governance indicators used in Table 1 are Policy-relevant determinants of the quality of governance in Table 1 with improvements in the quality of governance. Of course, spending decisions are not likely to be entirely exogenous, and it is possible that higher spending is sometimes a response to violence, crime and disorder. For this reason, we add the a term which measures the level of sociopolitical instability times spending on public order and safety. 16 With or without controlling for socio-political instability, the public order and safety variable is statistically insigni¯cant (the former is not reported to save space). Though we cannot rule out the possibility that spending improves the enforcement of contracts, an examination of expenditure data does not support this implication of the model. Among the controls in Table 1 , higher incomes and a history of British in°uence are conducive to more e®ective government, although these variables generally are not signi¯cant at conventional levels. There is weak evidence for diseconomies of scale in governance: population and land area generally have negative coe±cients, but they are rarely signi¯cant. Ethnic homogeneity is unrelated to the quality of governance, a¯nding inconsistent with Mauro (1995) . Even when constitutions, laws and rules are similar across countries, levels of corruption and e®ectiveness of mechanisms for enforcing agreements are often dissimilar. One plausible explanation for these disparate results is di®erences in the ability of civil society to exercise accountability on governments. Civil liberties, including a free and independent media, can inhibit self-seeking or incompetent behavior by government o±cials. 
Inequality
Policies to reduce income inequality are a second possible way to increase trust. Two ways to reduce income inequality are to provide universal primary and secondary education, and to transfer resources from the rich to the poor. Table 3 presents some evidence on these implications of the model. Table 3 is the Gini coe±cient for income inequality, averaging all available observations on Gini over the 1985-95 period to smooth out short-term°uctuations.
The dependent variable in
Control variables include per capita income and the share of the labor force in agriculture. The Building Trust 10 \Kuznets curve" literature suggests that these relationships may be nonlinear; however, linear speci¯cations turn out to provide a much better¯t.
Higher average schooling attainment is associated with lower income inequality (equation 1), but the relationship is signi¯cant at only the 10% level (2-tailed test). The coe±cient on schooling indicates that each additional year of school reduces the Gini value by 1 point. Higher average attainment could be produced in part, however, by high levels of tertiary schooling for elites.
We therefore added a measure of inequality in educational attainment, which turned out to be insigni¯cant (and is not reported to save space).
Equation 2 This variable is highly signi¯cant: higher spending on transfers is associated with lower income inequality. The estimated coe±cient on transfers indicates that Gini drops by 1 point for each increase of about 1.5 percentage points in the transfers-to-GDP ratio. Though this exercise ignores potential endogeneity, and the history of inequality that could a®ect the incentives of governments and voters to favor income transfers, the results do suggest that income redistribution is a viable instrument to reduce inequality and raise trust.
Social Distance
In the Zak & Knack (2001) model, trust increases as \e®ective social distance" declines, i.e. as types become more similar, or cooperative norms extend to a wider radius of contacts, encompassing members of other ethnic groups or social classes. E®ective social distance may decline with improvements in communications and transportation infrastructure that permit more frequent contact across groups producing a homogenizing e®ect. In the absence of any quanti¯able measure of e®ective social distance, we directly analyze the impact of communications and transportation infrastructure on trust.
In In addition to its e®ects on trust via strengthening formal institutions, civil liberties may increase trust by facilitating communication across ethnic groups and social classes. Accordingly, equation 4 of Table 4 adds the civil liberties index to the trust regression. This coe±cient should capture both the indirect impact on trust through formal institutions (which are not included in the regression), and any e®ects via reductions in e®ective social distance. Each 1point improvement in the 1-7 civil liberties index is associated with an increase in trust of nearly 6 percentage points. Similarly, press freedoms is added to the trust regression in equation 5.
This variable is not signi¯cant at conventional levels, though the point estimate suggests that a 3-point increase in the 100-point press freedom index is associated with a 1 percentage-point rise in trust.
18 Data source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, 1999.
Policy Optimality
The empirical results show that there is a set of policies that in°uence trust levels. These include strengthening formal institutions by raising years in school, expanding civil liberties, and increasing press freedoms. Income inequality can be reduced by increased education and redistributive transfers, while trust can be directly raised facilitating communication by increasing the number of land-based phones, mobile phones, paved roads, and through greater civil liberties. Our¯nal task asks if any of these have a su±ciently powerful impact on trust relative to their cost to be considered a viable development policy.
Three policy variables that we show raise trust can be, or must be, left out of this analysis.
First, building paved roads is ignored as a way to facilitate trust due to its prohibitive cost.
Archondo-Callao (2000) reports that it costs $250,000 per kilometer to build a paved road in a developing country. 20 Given this cost, we can immediately dismiss paved roads as a cost-e®ective way to build trust. Second, freedoms cannot be included in the analysis as there is no straightforward way to evaluate the costs of raising civil liberties or press freedoms. Substantial evidence indicates that freedoms follow from income growth (Feng & Zak, 1999; Burkhart & Lewis-Beck, 1994) , and we know that higher incomes raise trust (Zak & Knack, op cit.), but there is no way to evaluate the economic e±ciency of freedoms as a trust-based development policy without directly measuring costs. 21 Alternatively, because income growth raises trust, continual growth sustains a virtuous circle in which higher trust occurs \for free."
These leaves us with four policy variables for which costs and bene¯ts can be calculated: education, transfers, land phones and mobile phones. Recall that the optimality criterion compares marginal values, i.e. how much additional funding on a policy raises trust which then raises incomes. Building Trust
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(\school life expectancy") similar to Hanushek & Kimko (2000) . 22 The education data come from UNESCO and the World Bank. 23 The average for the countries in the sample is $0.0004 per capita to add one year additional year of education for the school-aged population (the standard deviation is 0.002). Note that the average years of education when our sample begins in 1970 is 5.4 years (standard deviation 2.6). Our empirics show that education a®ects trust in three ways: by raising institutional quality (Table 1) , by reducing inequality (Table 3) , and directly raising interpersonal trust ( The next row in Table 5 applies a similar calculation for the e®ect of phones on trust and income. The data for telephone costs uses the average annual spending by residential users on phone service. 24 The average individual in the sample spends $463 per year on telephone usage (standard deviation $153), so the cost of an additional 1,000 people using phones is $463,000
annually (data on infrastructure costs for phone lines was unavailable). Using the estimated coe±cients for the e®ect of phone usage on trust in to transfer a single dollar, our analysis shows that this policy is an e±cient way to raise trust.
Indeed, this result obtains because inequality so strongly a®ects trust. The e±cacy of raises trust with redistributive transfers suggests a further explanation for the extraordinarily high degree of trust in the Scandinavian countries.
Conclusion
We set out in this paper to ask how amenable trust levels are to policy intervention. Our analysis shows that trust can be raised directly by increasing communication and education, and indirectly by strengthening formal institutions that enforce contracts and by reducing income inequality. Among the policies that impact these factors, only education, redistributive transfers, and freedom satisfy the e±ciency criterion which compares the cost of policies with the bene¯ts citizens receive in terms of higher living standards. Further, our analysis suggests that good policy initiates a virtuous circle: policies that raise trust e±ciently, improve living standards, raise civil liberties, enhance institutions, and reduce corruption, further raising trust. Trust, democracy, and the rule of law are thus the foundation of abiding prosperity. Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors in parentheses. A * (**) indicates significance at .05 (.01) level for 2-tailed tests. Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors in parentheses. A * (**) indicates significance at .05 (.01) level for 2-tailed tests. Dependent variable is trust. Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors in parentheses. A * (**) indicates significance at .05 (.01) level for 2-tailed tests. Civil liberties ranges from 1 (most free) to 7 (least free). 
